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I. Introduction
A. Perspective
One of the major weaknesses of the United States Draft for a United
Nations Convention for a Seabed R~gime,l results from its draftsmen's
assumption that it would be universal and would exclude the possibility of
alternative regimes co-existing with it. While its silence on the status and
rights of non-participants may not be surprising, its apparent assumption
that states not parties to it could be bound by its terms would not appear to
be in the best interests either of the regime or of its promoting nation, the
United States. 2 Its general acceptance might well involve types of exten-
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tThis article is based on a memorandum of law for Deepsea Ventures Inc., a subsidiary
of Tenneco Corp. Notwithstanding that provenance, the thoughts herein have a sturdy
independence.
1United States Working Paper, Draft United Nations Convention on the International
Seabed Area, tabled Aug. 3, 1970, United Nations General Assembly Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean floor Beyond National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/25; see REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF THE SEABED
AND OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION, 25 U.N. GAOR.
Supp. 21 at 130, U.N. Doc. A/8021 (1970) [hereinafter cited as "U.S. Draft"].2For a criticism of the U.S. Draft from this standpoint see Jennings, The United States
Draft Treaty on the International Seabed Area-Basic Principles, 20 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
433 (1971) [hereinafter cited as "Jennings"]. Note id. at 453, in which the author concludes
his criticism of the U.S. Draft, after pointing out that its "paper universality" is of "doubtful
pedigree" in the following terms:
There is surely more hope for an international r6gime that third States can, and indeed
must, live with, or rather live alongside, than for one that third states, which to exploit
what the present law regards as their exclusive resources, are almost compelled to defy;
for in such a context it is by no means clear that the novel international r6gime would
prove the stronger.
The thrust of the article which follows is to investigate the contours of such a r6gime which
would govern the relations of states, with respect to deep seabed resources, both anterior to
the coming into being of the proposed treaty r6gime. It would also govern, after that point of
time, the relations of states living "alongside" the treaty rgime, both among themselves and
with the states participating in that rgime.
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sive coercive action not permitted under contemporary international law in
order to obtain the compliance of non-signatory states.
These assumptions, underlying the United States draft, become all the
more unpalatable when we may have legitimate doubts as to whether a
requisite two-thirds majority could be mustered behind its terms, or behind
the terms of any general-law-of-the-sea convention, by 1974. Furthermore
even if the proposed 1974 conference did produce a convention, years
would still pass, as we know from the time lag after the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Law of the Sea, before it could formally come into
force.
Accordingly, there is a need to put various proposals for r6gimes into
perspective, and to view them against the background of the present
general international law governing deep seabed mining activities, not only
because this may well provide the basis for an interim r6gime, but also
because it would determine the contours of possible international r6gimes
which could come into existence in the absence of an international con-
stituent convention, or even in the absence of international r6gimes arising
out of the interactions of reciprocating domestic r6gimes-for example that
contemplated in the proposed Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources
Act.3
B. Outline
At the present time, customary international law does provide for the
lawful taking of nodules on the beds of the high seas. While the high seas
are common to all nations and cannot be appropriated by anyone or any
nation, the wealth they contain can become the object of proprietorship.
This distinction is illustrated by the following quotation by Grotius from
Plautus:
[W]hen the slave says: "The sea is certainly common to all persons," the
fisherman agrees; but when the slave adds: "Then what is found in the
common sea is common property," he rightly objects, saying: "But what my
net and hooks have taken, is absolutely my own." 4
Grotius also pointed out that while states and individuals are not per-
mitted to assert dominion over the air and sea which are "common," or
"public," such masterless things as wild animals, fish and birds may be
reduced to possession "[f]or if any one seizes those things and assumes
possession of them, they can become the objects of private ownership." 5
6S. 2801, 92d Cong. 2d Sess., H.R. 13904, 92d Cong. 2d Sess., now S. 1134, 93d Cong.
1st Sess., H.R. 9, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
4GROTIUs, FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, 29 (McGoffin transl. Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace 1916) [hereinafter cited as "GROTIUS"].
51D.
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On an analogy with the traditional Grotian examples of fish and game,
individuals have also been considered as lawfully taking ambergris,
sponges, pearl oysters and pearls, chanks, biche-de-mer and goods from
abandoned wrecks, and many other ownerless items of food or wealth, on
the sea floor, when these have been found and possessed in areas beyond
the limits of the jurisdiction of any nation. When the scientists aboard
HMS Challenger took from the seabed and possessed, on behalf of the
expedition,othe first manganese nodules ever found by man, their right so to
do was not questioned. Had it been, the justification of their appropriations
would have been in terms of their right to take and own unowned goods in
the high seas which are capable of being possessed.
At that time, today's commentators' distinctions between a taking of
resources for purposes of "scientific research" or "exploration" from one
for purposes of "exploitation," were not recognized. (One may, further,
parenthetically question the propriety of this contemporary lumping of
"scientific research" with "exploitation" in the context of seabed matters,
when a great effort is being made, by the proponents of the freedom of
scientific research, to distinguish them.)
It is interesting to note that the traditional Grotian theory for justifying
the appropriation of goods in international law which has just been outlined
is not the only one to be found in diplomatic practice. The history of
mining on Spitzbergen before the Treaty of Paris of 1920, in which the
participating states withdrew their individual, inchoate claims to the Archi-
pelago and quitclaimed these to Norway, subject to the retention of rights
on behalf of their nationals and to the further limitation of Norwegian
sovereignty in important respects, is most illuminating. It shows that all
interested countries based their diplomatic postures on the assumption that
their nationals did not merely have title under general international law to
coals which they had severed from the ground and had brought under their
physical control, but also to the unsevered and untouched coal measures
lying in the ground within the mining tracts which the miners had located
and worked, and of which they had given public notification and had
recorded in appropriate ways.
While the Grotian theory of appropriation is well known, that discerning
the international legal recognition of exclusive rights to mining tracts has
not received its due recognition-probably because the evidence of the
state practice in which it is reflected, and which presumes its validity, has
long remained buried in archival collections. Accordingly, this paper will
examine the international legal implications of the diplomatic vindication of
the appropriation of mining tracts on Spitzbergen when that Archipelago
was a terra nullius. It will also touch on contemporary doctrines govern-
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ing the acquisition of possession, to the extent that such a discussion
becomes necessary for the development of the argument that there are
alternative customary international law doctrines to those generally stated
by the text writers and which stem from Hugo Grotius' reliance on a crude
notion of capture as the basis of possessory rights.
II. International Law and Rights of Possession
International law has developed only hazy concepts of possessory rights.
On the other hand, the doctrine of occupation serves to justify the acquisi-
tion of masterless territory by states, so that extensive tracts may be taken
through acts which are not felt throughout the whole region, while on the
other, that same doctrine is usually cited to limiting the taking of fish or
animals only to those things which have been reduced to the taker's
complete control.
Thus, in the Status of Eastern Greenland case,6 the Permanent Court of
International Justice recognized that in thinly populated and in uninhabited
areas, very little in the nature of possessory control may be required. In
that case Danish acts of sovereignty which had mainly been performed in
the western and southern regions of Greenland were held to have been
sufficient to have excluded Norway's claim from the northeastern coastal
area of that vast plateau of ice.
By contrast with this extensive view of occupation when dealing with
states' claims to acquire territory, the same doctrine, when applied to
animals, fish or such inanimate objects as jewels, treasures or wrecks, has
generally been held to have a far stricter requirement of effectiveness. It
has, indeed, turned on the notion of capture as Grotius' quotation from
Plautus, to which reference has been made, illustrates.
If a r6gime were established to govern the exploitation of the seabed
hard mineral resources along the lines of the primitive concept of capture
which Grotius, some three and a half centuries ago, thought adequate to
protect the rights of fishermen, there would be a free-for-all on the seabed,
which would be most counterproductive for world welfare and world
peace. While it would appear that five companies are currently interested in
mining seabed resources, they could engage in races for choice sites and in
attempts to exhaust them, before their discovery from competitors. 6 a
61933 P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B No. 53. See also, Clipperton Island Arbitration, 26 AM. J. INT'L
L. 390 (1932); and Palmas Island Arbitration, 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829 (1928).
6"Three United States corporations are currently interested in mining hard minerals from
the floor of the deep ocean, namely Tenneco Corporation, the Kennecott Copper Corpo-
ration, and Hughes Tool Company. One German and one Japanese company are in the
process of formation, the latter with the generous support of very extensive government
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Such an uncontrolled state of affairs would bring in its train the further
undesirable effects of over-capitalization and cause wild market fluctua-
tions, and affect the world market price of the relevant hard minerals, not
only with respect to the ocean floor resource, but with respect to
land-based resources as well. Briefly, the problems and disasters of the
West Texas oil fields of the early twenties, could be repeated in terms of
affected hard minerals.
Secondly, the acceptance of a primitive right of capture could put titles
to minerals won from the floor of the deep ocean in jeopardy, since some
states may consider one corporation to be the finder, and hence the "true
owner," of minerals placed in commerce, while other states may recognize
a prior right to those minerals as enuring to some other enterprise, leading
to a situation of irreconcilable contradictions.
It is not necessary, at the present time, to accept Grotius's theory of
possession, nor the "free-for-all" r6gime to which it gives rise. Possessory
rights to deepsea floor minerals could be seen as stemming from another
theory of possession. This might be viewed, possibly, as a rejection, in
terms of general international law, of the limited notion of the acquisition of
possessory rights which the Grotian theory requires, or alternatively, as a
special customary view of possessory rights over minerals in situ governing
the mining industry in the absence of state, national or international legisla-
tion.
Should the latter view prevail, the special customary r6gime would then
operate to exclude Grotius's principle of possession for purposes of mining
hard minerals from deep ocean floors, although it would still be held to
prevail in all other aspects of the general international law governing the
acquisition of moveable property.
A. A Re-examination of Possession
In discussions of gaining possession, as distinct from establishing contin-
uance in possession,7 international law and domestic law systems have
tended to focus, possibly unduly, on the relation of the possessor with a
single item rather than with'a collection or group. This, in turn, has led to
the development of theses stressing the need for a specific, immediate and
active control by the possessor over the object possessed.a
financing. Metals Week writes of a total figure of a "$227 million semi-public venture to
pursue deep-ocean mining and processing of manganese nodules..." See id., Jan. 15, 1973 at
9, and, id., June II, 1973 at 2.7For this distinction see HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 215- 16, 235 (35th Printing 1943)
[hereinafter cited as "HOLMES"].
81d., 216- 19, 239, 245. See, for two common law examples (one English and the other
from New York), Young v. Hitchens, 6 Q.B. 606, 115 Eng. Rep. 228 (1844) (notwithstanding
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A re-examination of some of the cases from the Anglo-American com-
mon law, which have long agitated differences among lawyers, may illus-
trate, in terms of familiar subject matter, the misleading effects of that
focus and of that stress.
A note of caution, which may not be necessary, should be sounded ex
abundantia cautela. The cases of the common law on possession are not
discussed because of any pretended international authority that may be
imputed to them. On the other hand, they do illustrate universal problems.
Furthermore, Mr. Justice Holmes tells us that while the "[t]heory of
possession has fallen into the hands of the philosophers," 9 he claims for the
common law "that it is important to show that a far more developed, more
rational and mightier body of law than the Roman, gives no sanction to
either premise, or conclusion as held by Kant and his successors."'1
Finally, we may follow the practice of jurisprudential writers when
dealing with possession, of drawing on.philosophers, civilians and common
law sources without discrimination, except insofar as this may be de-
manded by the development of argument and the clarification of definitions.
We may now ask whether the focus of attention on the possession of a
specific object and on the need for the direct exercise of power over that
object is, indeed, called for by the cases usually cited in support. The
well-known cases of Young v. Hitchens and Pierson v. Post, have already
been adverted to. 1 It should be noted that counsel for the plaintiff in the
former case argued that, in the whaling industry for example, appropriation
was considered to be complete when "fairly proceeding towards accom-
plishment." At that point, the possessor's intent is clear and his control so
manifest as to be entitled to protection.
The Queen's Bench, however, relegated this thesis to situations in which
special customs govern. And this has become conventional wisdom. But is
that wisdom congruent with the explanations usually offered for reconciling
Bridges v. Hawkesworth' 2 with McA voy v. Medina? 3 In the former case a
a verdict the other way, the Court of Queen's Bench decided that when pilchards were almost
entirely surrounded by a net, with an opening occupied by boats stationed there to prevent the
fish from escaping they were not reduced to possession as against a stranger who rowed
through the opening and caught them with his own net); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cal. R. 175 (N.Y.
1805)(action does not lie against a defendant who shot and killed, in full view of the plaintiff, a
fox being pursued by the plaintiff, who had originally started and chased it); Buster v.
Newkirk, 20 Johns. Cas. 75 (N.Y. 1822) (when plaintiff had wounded and chased a
deer-discontinuing the hunt at nightfall, the next day he resumed the hunt to find defendant
had killed and appropriated the wounded deer, Pierson v. Post, supra, was held to govern).9HOLMES, 206.
'ld., 210.
I'Supra, note 8.
1221 L.J.Q.B. 75 (1851).
1 I Allen (Mass.) 548 (1886).
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customer in a shop who, before the shop-keeper knew of it, picked up a
pocket-book which had been dropped onto the floor of the public part of
the shop by another customer, could keep it as against the shop-keeper. In
the latter, a barber was held to have a better possessory right than the
finder to a pocket-book which had been left on the barber's table.
The usual explanation offered is "a distinction between things volun-
tarily placed on a table and things dropped onto the floor"'14 on the basis
that the former indicates "an implied request to the shopkeeper to guard
it."'15 Kincaid v. Eaton'6 was a suit for'a reward offered by the owner of a
pocket-book. The claimant had found it on a desk installed by a bank for
the use of its customers and located in the banking chamber outside the
teller's counter. Holding that the case did not involve the finding of a lost
article, the court said that "the occupants of the banking house, and not the
plaintiff, were the proper depositaries of an article so left."' 17
Holmes suggests that, possibly, since the bank was a proper depositary
of the article, the decision can be explained as only deciding "that the
pocket-book was not lost within the condition of the offer."' 8
A number of cases show how possession can be gained, recognized and
protected when the lawful possessor's attention is not focused on the
object. While it may be true that in such cases as Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co.' 9
and South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman,20 the landowners' success
in repelling the claims of finders when the articles in contention were
embedded in the soil of the land, may be ascribed to a difference between
the standards for protecting the continuance of possession from those
which have to be satisfied for its acquisition, there are other cases in which
an entity with a special, ambient, interest is seen as having some special or
quasi-possessory claim.
Thus in Hibbert v. McKiernan2' a golf club was said to have a "special
property" in golf balls lost by players which excluded any claim to them by
a finder. It may be tempting to explain this case, which is clearly dis-
tinguishable from both the Elwes and the Sharman cases, on the grounds of
the balls remaining on the surface of the land, the relative recentness of the
loss, or the presumed relation of the club to the players (these being its
members or their guests) on the basis of policy. Kocourek offered this type





1933 Ch. D. 562 (1886) (a prehistoric boat embedded in the soil).
20[1896] 2 Q.B. 44 (two rings buried in the mud of a pool).
21[1948] I All. E.R. 860, [19481 2 K.B. 142.
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is, in the last analysis, simply a question of policy, which unfortunately is
heavily obscured by a wholly irrelevant discussion of possession. 22
Tempting as the charms of such resorts as this to touchstone of "policy"
may be, it is to be feared that they merely darken counsel. The word
"policy" itself becomes meaningless as a legal concept. For after we have
said that policy determined the cases we still need to show what that policy
is. If an answer to that question is given we have at least a clue to the legal
values and the legal principles involved. If, on the other hand, we merely
shrug our shoulders and say that we should not attempt to verbalize any
reconciliation of these cases in analytical terms, because "policy" dictated
their individual holdings, we are faced by a frank explanation that the
decisions reflect "palm-tree justice" rather than legal principles.
The submission here is not that an individualizing policy of determining
each case on whatever merits judges and juries may feel to be inherent in
each situation provides the premise of judgment, but rather that lawyers
and writers have overlooked other important factors. For example, the
explanation of the golf club's "special property" in Hibbert v. McKiernan
may lie in the special relation of the players (as members or guests), and
the club. Again, the special relation of banker and customer may well
provide the explanation of Kincaid v. Eaton.
The slogan "special custom of the industry," has permitted courts to
argue that cases falling outside the narrow limits usually envisioned for the
acquisition of possession, should be distinguished from those which they
consider to reflect the necessary principles of possession in general. 23 On
the other hand, such a principle cannot be invoked to explain Hibbert v.
McKiernan. And it would be less than satisfactory to assert, with Profes-
sors Dias and Hughes, that it merely reflects "the clear sentiment that
dishonesty should not go unpunished."'24
Rather it points to the unsatisfactory restrictions of traditional theory
and, going beyond McAvoy v. Medina and Kincaid v. Eaton, asserts that
possession can be recognized as existing in a person who shows the
intention and will to act as the possessor, and also some exercise or display
of such rights. 25 The more liberal scope of possessory rights in the position
stressed here emphasizes a more inclusive rule than that to be found in the
expressions of conventional wisdom. But it is necessary also to recall
22 KocoUREK, JURAL RELATIONS 389.
23See, e.g. Young v. Hitchens, 6 Q.B. 606, 115 Eng. Rep. 228 (1844).
24
DIAS & HUGHES, JURISPRUDENCE 328 (1957).
2This is an adaptation of the requirement, laid down by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case, which asserted that a
state claiming territorial possession must show "the intention and will to act as sovereign and
some exercise or display of such sovereignty". [1933] PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53 at 46.
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Holmes' apt illustration. "If," he wrote, "there were only one other man in
the world, and he were safe under lock and key, the person having the key
would not possess the swallows that flew over the prison."
B. Miners' Rights
In the landmark case of Jennison v. Kirk,26 Mr. Justice Field, a lawyer
from California to whom the mining jurisprudence of that state and her
neighbors was familiar, defined the rights of the miners to appropriate their
discoveries. He said:
In every district which [the miners] occupied they framed certain rules for
their government, by which the extent of ground they could severally hold for
mining was designated, their possessory right to such ground secured and
enforced, and contests between them either avoided or determined. These
rules bore a marked similarity, varying in the several districts only according
to the extent and character of the mines; distinct provisions being made for
different kinds of mining, and mining in drifts or tunnels. They all recognized
discovery, followed by appropriation, as the foundation of the possessor's
title, and development by working as the condition of its retention. And they
were so framed as to secure all comers, within practicable limits, absolute
equality of right and privilege in working the mines. Nothing but such equal-
ity would have been tolerated by the miners, who were emphatically the
law-makers, as respects mining, upon the public lands in the State. The first
appropriator was everywhere held to have, within certain well-defined limits,
a better right than others to the claims taken up; and in all controversies,
except as against the government, he was regarded as the original owner, for
whom title was to be traced. 27
This is an apt description of the rights of miners as they might appear to
a Californian who may possibly be nonconversant with the practices and
legal expectations of the European immigrants in the California gold fields.
The rights of miners which these communities evolved did not spring, as
many observers believe, fully articulated and "developed," from the turbu-
lent mining districts. They have a long and unbroken history which can
travel back to the Middle Ages, if not earlier.2 8 These customs, for ex-
2698 U.S. 453 (1878).
2798 U.S. 453, 458 (1878). See also Argonaut Mining Co. v. Kennedy Mining and
Milling Co., 131 Cal. 15, 63 Pac. 148, 150 (1900), aff'd 189 U.S. 1 (1903), in which the
Supreme Court of California tells us:
Some regulations as to mining claims sprung into existence naturally. in fact necessarily.
First, so far as possible, each person was given a specified portion of the ground, which
he could mine. Secondly, the allotment to each was so limited that there should be no
monopoly. So far as possible, all should have an equal chance. The right of the first
possessor was preferred, but no matter was considered more important than the limita-
tion upon the extent of the claims. And, thirdly, as a corollary from these two cardinal
rules, the third follows: That each claimant shall mark plainly upon the surface of the
earth the boundaries of his claim, that others may locate claims without interfering with
him....
281 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING 2-6 (The Rocky Mountains Law Foundation ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as "AMERICAN LAW OF MINING].
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ample, have been long recognized as part of the Anglo-American common
law,29 as well as of other legal systems. Thus the American Law of Mining
tells us:
The strong influence of the common law on our mining law is apparent in
many areas. The customs of the Derbyshire miners, as noted above, resemble
the way in which we mark off lode locations, our exclusive surface rights of
locators and even to some extent our approach to extralateral rights. We have
been greatly influenced by the ad coelum theory in our cases dealing with
subsurface and extralateral rights of locators. Our general attitude toward
free-mining under the federal legislation of 1866 and 1872 has an ancient
heritage in both the Germanic and English law.30
The common law principles which were manifest in the practices of the
mining districts were later enacted into state and federal legislation estab-
,lishing both the continuity and necessity of the ancient principles they
embodied. The first legislation affecting the rights acquired in the California
gold districts and recorded by the camp recorders 3 ' was a provision which
was drafted by Stephen J. Field, and inserted in the California Civil
Practice Act in 1851. It provided:
In actions representing "mining claims", proof shall be admitted of the
customs, usages, or regulations established and in force at the bar, or dig-
gings, embracing such claim; and such customs, usages or regulations, when
not in conflict with the constitution and laws of this State, shall govern the
decision of the action.3 2
Between 1848 and 1866 similar laws were passed in other western
states, and in 1866 the Congress enacted the Act Granting the Right to
Way Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands and for Other Pur-
poses. Despite its title it has been characterized as "the first lode location
law." 33 Its Section 9 provides the classic miner's rights "grandfather
clause":
That whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for
mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and ac-
crued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs,
laws, and the decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested
rights shall be maintained and protected in the same; and the right of way for
construction of ditches and canals for the purposes aforesaid is hereby ac-
knowledged and confirmed: Provided, however, that whenever, after the
passage of this act, any person or persons shall, in the construction of any
ditch or canal, injure or damage the possession of any settler on the public
domain, the party committing such injury or damage shall be liable to the
party injured for such injury or damage.3 4
29See Traynor J., in Ames v. Empire Star Mines Co., 17 Cal. 2d 213, 110 P. 2d 13, 16.
cert. den., 314 U.S. 651 (1941).30 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING 5 (footnotes omitted).3
aSee, e.g., Id., 23.
32California General Laws 1850-6 1, §5552.
33 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING29.
3414 Stat. 251 (1866).
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 4
806 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
In Jennison v. Kirk, Mr. Justice Field, for the Supreme Court of the
United States, affirmed that the policy of the Act was to confirm titles
acquired under miners' rights. He said:
In no provision of the act was any intention manifested to interfere with the
possessory rights previously acquired, or which might be afterwards ac-
quired; the intention expressed was to secure them by a patent from the
government.3 5
Since the 1866 Act and down to the present, mining legislation in the
United States has, where vested rights have been acquired before the
statute's enactment, included a grandfather clause preserving such rights.
A recent example has been provided by Section 4(a) of the Geothermal
Steam Act of 1970.36 This consistent practice of enacting "grandfather
clauses" to protect prior-acquired vested mining rights, reflects a contin-
uing and uniform legislative policy which recognizes the validity and the
equity, as well as the necessity, of those rights. In addition to confirming
the miners' rights, these enactments operate as declaratory legislation
affirming the common law principles giving rise to the customs of the
mining districts and underpinning the rights which those districts recog-
nized.
In addition to the long history in many countries, of the institution of
miner's rights, whenever alternative r6gimes had broken down, or had
failed to come into existence, this institution appears to have sprung spon-
taneously into existence. The early history of the goldfields of South Africa
and Australia, the miners in the Sierra Nevada of California and in the
Yukon of Alaska all testify to the universality and necessity of this in-
stitution's provenance.36 a
This proposition is illustrated by the way in which the mining rights that
3598 U.S. 453, 459 (1878). See also Traynor J., in Ames v. Empire Star Mines Co., 17
Cal. 2d 213, 110 P. 2d 13, 16, cert. den. 314 U.S. 651 (1941).
3684 Stat. 1566, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1970). The legislative history of this provision
tells us that:
This committee is of the opinion that those individuals who pioneered during the early
years to develop geothermal steam under then existing law established equitable claims
and should have a priority under any new legislation. S. 368, as amended, provides such
a priority.
36 The following list of cases testifies to the general recognition of the miners' right,
customs of the mining districts and mining camps of the American West (and in addition to
those of the Sierra Nevada) by the courts of 1849 to 1866, or relating to the period before
1866 (the year of the enactment of the first federal "grandfather clause" protecting the
established rights of the miners. An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal
Owners over Public Lands and for Other Purposes of 1966, ch. 262, §2, 9, 14 Stat. 251):
Federal Cases
Sparrow v. Strong, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 97 (1865); Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453 (1878); Glacier
Mountain Silver Mining Co. v. Willis, 127 U.S. 471 (1888).
Arizona
Rush v. French, I Ariz. 99, 25 Pac. 816 (1874); Johnson v. McLaughlin, I Ariz. 493, 4 Pac.
130 (1884); Watervale Mining Co. v. Leach, 4 Ariz. 34, 33 Pac. 418 (1893).
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came into existence in the Western States of the United States, at times
antecedent to the relevant state and federal legislation, were confirmed in
the grandfather clauses of those statutes. They were valid from their
inception and not from the enactment of the grandfather clauses because:
(i) the common law underpinned and incorporated into the decisional
process the relevant and reasonable anteriorly existing practices of the
mining camps which were not inconsistent with existing law; (ii) the grand-
father clauses in state and federal legislation pointed to the anterior cus-
tomary rules to those rights, and gave any needed validation to the cus-
tomary rules out of which those rights were molded; and (iii) the uniformity
of miner's rights concepts and their universal distribution throughout the
world of the common law, wherever surface lands remained unalienated,
points to a general customary rule of common law governing the opening
and working of mines whereby no subsequent surface landowner might
lawfully claim rights which limit those traditionally known as miner's
rights-provided the miner observes his obligation of due diligence.
C. Spitzbergen-Mining Claims on a Terra Nullius
In. the preceding section the legal attributes of the Californian and Rocky
Mountain States' miners' rights were shown to be more than mere fabri-
cation of special local requirements, arising under the exigencies of frontier
life and attuned to the evanescent conditions of the times and places of
early mining and prospecting in the West. They have been established in
the mainstream of the common law. They have, however, been overlooked,
possibly because text writers have found them to be embarrassing to their
theories, or have dismissed them as falling within a specialization of legal
study and practice. This has had the effect of permitting the subjectivities
of the study and the economies of the classroom to impose a straightjacket
on reality.
In this Section, the rise of similar practices to those of the American
California
Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855); English v. Johnson. 17 Cal. 107 (1860); Prosser v. Parks,
18 Cal. 47 (1861); Gore v. McBrayer, 18 Cal. 582 (1861); Morton v. Solambo Copper Mining
Co.. 26 Cal. 527 (1864); St. John v. Kidd. 26 Cal. 263 (1864); Table Mountain Tunnel Co. v.
Stanahan, 31 Cal. 387 (1866).
Colorado
Consolidated Republican Mountain Mining v. Lebanon Mining Co., 9 Colo. 343, 12 Pac. 212
(1886).
Montana
King v. Edwards, I Mont. 235 (1870).
Nevada
Mallett v. Uncle Sam Gold & Silver Mining Co.. I Nev. 188 (1865); Oreamuno v. Uncle Sam
Gold & Silver Mining Co., I Nev. 215 (1865); Smith v. North American Mining Co.. I Nev.
423 (1865); Golden Fleece Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Cable Consolidated Gold & Silver
Mining Co.. 12 Nev. 312 (1877).
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West in international law on the terra nullius of Spitzbergen will be ap-
praised. This will point up a more universal equity and necessity which
calls for the recognition of those rights, which are too frequently associated
only with the mining camps of the West in the middle years of the last
century. The archipelago and main island of Spitzbergen provide the set-
ting. These islands had been discovered (and were used) by English and
Dutch whalers in the late 16th and early 17th centuries. They established
extensive summer settlements there.
In 1614 King James I of England proclaimed the main island's annexa-
tion and named it King James his Newland. 3 7 The Dutch contested this
claim. After the bay fishery there for whales had ceased, the two states'
territorial pretensions there remained, but were not pressed. In later years,
Danish, Russian, German and Norwegian claims were added and a diplo-
matic standoff ensued. Each country was prepared to accept the archi-
pelago's status as terra nullius, provided all the other interested parties did
likewise.
The United States also expressed a special interest in the islands. This
was not territorial, however, but to assure adequate protection for the
business interests of the Arctic Coal Company, a Boston enterprise with
extensive coal mines on Spitzbergen. In the decade prior to World War I
Norway engaged in intense diplomatic activity in support of a r6gime
which recognized the archipelago's status as no man's land but purported
to give Russia, Norway and Sweden a special standing in the islands'
administration.
The various drafts for a Convention were criticized on the grounds that
the convention would establish, in effect, a recognition of the joint sover-
eignty of the three countries. There were ancilliary grounds of criticism.
These related to the judiciary, the right to tax, and the protection of the
property rights of enterprises already exploiting mineral resources (espe-
cially coal) there. 38
After World War 1, nine states recognized, in the Treaty of Paris of
1920,39 Norwegian sovereignty over the islands. The treaty also recog-
3 7M. CONWAY, No MAN'S LAND 65 (1906).380n the history of the various North Sea states' claims to the islands of the Spitzbergen
Archipelago, and of their economic activities in the area (especially fishing and whaling in
Spitzbergen's offshore waters), see FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 112, 181-85,
193-94. 198-200. 527 (1911); Nielsen. The Solution of the Spitzbergen Question, 14 AM. J.
INT'L L. 232 (1920) [hereinafter cited as "Nielsen"]; Lansing, A Unique International
Problem, II AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1917); Shepstone, Coal and Iron from the Arctic, 121
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 362, 376 (1919) [hereinafter cited as "Shepstone"].39Signed Feb. 9, 1920, 43 Stat. 1892. T.S. 686, 2 L.N.T.S. 7, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPp.
199 (1924). The nine signatory states were: United States, Great Britain, France, Italy. Japan,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Russia protested against this agreement, as
she had not been consulted despite the historic claims she entertained towards the Archi-
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nized and preserved the established rights of citizens of the signatory
countries, to exploit their coal and other mineral holdings and to fish in
Spitzbergen waters. 40 What is of interest, from the point of view of this
paper, is the provenance and recognition of those rights in the years and
decades before the Treaty was signed, when British, American, Norwe-
gian, Swedish and Russian coal companies operated there under the ward-
ship of their own Foreign Offices. A brief outline of the history of the
Arctic Coal Company's activities and the State Department's espousal of
its claims follows.
The Arctic Coal Company was incorporated under the laws of West
Virginia. It conducted its business from Boston. It worked four tracts of
coal-bearing ground on Spitzbergen, the first, the "Advent Bay Tract," was
purchased from one Ludwig Sollberg and the Trondhjem-Spitzbergen Kul-
compagnie, a Norwegian concern, in 1906. Sollberg and the Trond-
hjem-Spitzbergen Kulcompagnie had recorded their claims in 1900 with
both the Norwegian Foreign Office and Department of the Interior.41 (It
should be noted that Norway, like Russia and Sweden-and other inter-
ested states including the United States-did not, at that time, press any
territorial claim, but agreed that the archipelago was a terra nullius.41 a)
The remaining three tracts had been acquired by Messrs Ayer and
Longyear, who were the incorporators of the Arctic Coal Company, and
respectively, its President and Secretary, and were worked by the com-
pany. The total area which the company worked, under a claim of ex-
pelago. In 1924, however, she informed the Norwegian Government that she would recognize
Norway's sovereignty over Spitzbergen. Letter from the Norwegian Minister (Bryn) to the
Secretary of State, March 20, 1924, [1924] 1 FOR. REL. U.S. 1 (1939).40Treaty of Paris of 1920, supra note 39, arts 2, 6, 7 and annex. See also Nielsen, 232,
234. 4 tSee letter from the Arctic Coal Company (by Messrs Ayer and Longyear) to Secretary
of State Knox. Dec. 27, 1909, 346 Numerical File 1906- 1910, Case #3746. Record Group
59, Department of State. See also letter from Arctic Coal Co., to Secretary of State Bryan,
May 25, 1914. #950d.00.270, 4 Decimal File. Subnumbers 251-335c, Record Group 59.
Department of State.4 1 See letter from Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs to Fasting, May 11, 1904,
"Exhibit B" attached to letter from Messrs Ayer and Longyear to Secretary of State Root,
March 10, 1906, [1906] Department of State, Miscellaneous Letters. March 1906 Pts II &
III, Record Group 59, Department of State; Instructions by Secretary of State Bryan to
Collier and Schmederman regarding the "forthcoming International Conference on Spitzber-
gen to be held at Christiana". May 23, 1914, transaction #850d.00/27 Ia, 4 Decimal File,
Case #850d.00, Subnumbers 251-335c. Record Group 59, Department of State [hereinafter
cited as "Instructions"]. But note Telegram from Secretary of State Bryan to the American
Delegation at the Christiana Conference, July 3, 1914, transaction #850d.00/3 13, 4 Decimal
File, Case #850d.00, Subnumbers 25 1-335c, Record Group 59, Department of State:
If complete recognition of existing American interests could be obtained, together with
absolute guarantees against excessive taxation, unfair exactions and burdensome labor
and contract laws the simplest and probably most expedient plan would be to abandon
the principle of Terra Nullius and allow Norway to annex the Islands.
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clusive title to the coal in place, was in excess of 475 square miles. 42 The
claimants asserted their title on the basis of the "registration" of their
"titles" with the Department of State43 and the Department's acceptance
of that registration as conferring the titles claimed through possession,
posting of notices, active working and registration.
44
Any prospecting or mining by Norwegian or other foreign interests on
those tracts was characterized as "trespassing." The United States Gov-
ernment espoused this claim in a number of letters to the Norwegian
authorities. 45 This position was emphasized by a passage in President
Taft's Message to the Congress of December 7, 1909. He said, with
respect to the United States' acceptance of an invitation to participate in
the proposed international conference at Christiana to establish an inter-
national r6gime to govern Spitzbergen:
The Department of State. in view of proofs filed with it in 1906. showing
American possession, occupation and working of certain coal-bearing lands in
Spitzbergen, accepted the invitation under the reservation above stated [i.e.,
the questions of altering the status of the islands as countries belonging to no
particular State and as equally open to the citizens and subjects of all States,
should not be raised] and under the further reservation that all interests in
those islands already vested should be protected and that there should be
equality of opportunity for the future.46
The President's reference to "interests ... already vested" is dis-
tinguishable from the discredited "vested rights" theory in conflict of laws.
It is a term, not of theoretical explanation, but of legal ascription. It sets
the conditions of the way private individuals have in the past acquired
rights in sea areas, and territories outside the jurisdiction of recognized
international persons. The rights become "vested" or "acquired" under
general international law and, as such, they are opposable to a state which
42See correspondence in last footnote, and letter from N. Wilson (attorney for the Arctic
Coal Co., and Messrs Ayer and Longyear) to Secretary of State Bryan, May 25, 1914. at 3. 4
Decimal File, Case #850d.00, Subnumbers 251-335c, Record Group 59. Department of
State.
4See letter from N. Wilson to Secretary of State Root. March 10. 1906. and accom-
panying documents, [19061 Department of State. Miscellaneous Letters. March 1906. Pts II
& IlI, Record Group 59. Department of State.
44Letter from Robert Bacon, Acting Secretary. Department of State to Messrs Ayer and
Longyear, c/o N. Wilson. March 14. 1906, 288 Domestic Letters 526, Record Group 59.
Department of State.
4See, e.g., letter from United States Legation. Christiana to Norwegian Foreign Min-
ister Christopherson, July 30. 1909. and reply thereto. August I. 1909. American Legation
in Spitzbergen Correspondence 1909, 1908. 1909. Record Group 59, Department of State;
letter from Secretary of State Knox to Swenson, American Minister. Christiana. July 17.
1912. and attachments, American Legation, Christiana. Spitzbergen Correspondence. Feb.
29. 1912-Dec. 21. 1914. Record Group 84. Department of State; and Instructions, supra
note 41 a. at 2- 3.
46Annual Message of the President to Congress 7 December 1909, [1909] FOR. RELS. OF
THE U.S. IX at XIII (1914).
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later comes to exercise jurisdiction with respect to the area of those rights'
provenance.
D. "Acquired Rights"4 7
The Treaty of Paris of 192048 provides a prime example of the protec-
tion of rights acquired in a terra nullius. This was a treaty by which other
interested states quitclaimed their interests in the islands to Norway, re-
serving inviolate, however, the properties and rights which their citizens
had antecedently enjoyed. For the future, they also stipulated equality of
access and treatment for their citizens. Since the treaty should properly be
regarded as in the nature of a quitclaim, Norway could only receive what
the signatories then gave. This opens the question of whether the archi-
pelago's continental shelf now falls within Norway's sovereign rights.
Clearly, if the Powers then gave up to Norway what they then considered
as within their lawful claims, the Abu Dhabi Award49 would require the
decision that the 1920 grant contained in the Treaty of Paris would not
extend to rights not then in existence, but which evolved subsequently.
Since the agreement was merely a quitclaim, in favor of Norway, of the
rights the other signatories did not reserve, those which they did reserve on
behalf of themselves, their citizens or subjects cannot be regarded as being
created or validated by the treaty. They necessarily existed, as President
Taft's Message 50 amply demonstrates, antecedently to the Convention and
were preserved and protected by it. The United States Government held to
this opinion most pertinaciously.
It viewed the rights which Arctic Coal Company had acquired in Spitz-
bergen as having been sufficiently established for them to be the subject of
an international arbitration as to the boundaries of American enterprise's
holdings with those of a Norwegian citizen, one Hjorth.5 1 Furthermore, the
position of the United States was that opening coal mines within the Arctic
Coal Company's tract and the tracts belonging to Messrs Ayer and Long-
4 7See, for a discussion of this concept, Goldie, The Oceans' Resources and International
Law-Possible Developments in Regional Fisheries Management, 8 COLUMBIA J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. I, 25-28 (1969) [hereinafter cited as "Goldie, Fisheries Management" I and Goldie,
Sedentary Fisheries and Article 2(4) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf-A Plea for
a Separate Rigime, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 86, 93-95 (1969) [hereinafter cited as "Goldie,
Sedentary Fisheries"].4 8See, supra, footnote 39.
491 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.247 (1952).50See, supra, note 46 and accompanying text.5 1See, e.g., letter from Peirce (U.S. Minister to Norway) to Norwegian Minister of
Foreign Affairs Irgens. April 30, 1910. 2 American Legation in Christiana, Spitzbergen
Correspondence, 1910, Record Group 59, Department of State; Note Verbale from Depart-
ment of State to Norwegian Foreign Minister, Jan. 13, 1911. Case #850d.00/154, 2 American
Legation in Christiana, Spitzbergen Correspondence. Record Group 84, Department of State.
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year, and the removal of boundary markers therefrom, were tantamount to
"trespasses" 5 2 -despite the technical common law connotation of the term.
Finally, in the negotiations for establishing a r6gime governing Spitzbergen,
the United States asserted:
[T]he Government of the United States finds that for the present it cannot
give its adherence to any convention for the government or administration of
order in Spitzbergen which, while pronouncing upon the validity of claims to
land in Spitzbergen, does not recognize the indisputable validity of the claims
of its citizens as recorded in the Department of State at Washington. 3
E. Miners' Right-Special Custom or
General Rule?
The concepts of possession have come down to us from three main
sources whose waters are now mingled: the civil law, the philosophers and
the common law. The general belief that all these have in common the
notion that the taking of movable goods (or chattels) requires the apprehen-
sion of the thing, has been challenged specifically. Secondly, when land or
territory is possessed, the whole tract may become the possessor's when
only part is taken-provided that part may give the means of controlling
the whole. The contradictory themes of possession when traditionally
applied to goods in contrast to its application to land, would appear not
only to be an inaccurate summary of the law, but also to have no justifica-
tion in principle.
The history of miners' rights in the West of the United States, in
Canada, Australia, South Africa and other countries of major nineteenth
century immigration, point to a wider utility of the concept of possession
than that traditionally associated with it. Similarly, developments in Spitz-
bergen underscore the universality and necessity of recognizing that pos-
session of a mineral tract can be obtained by opening and working a part of
it. By analogy, it can reasonably be argued that when an ocean bed
resource of hard minerals has been developed and is being worked, the
developing enterprise establishes, by that activity, a valid claim of right to
an area equivalent to a tract on dry land, which provides an equitable
return and no more, in terms of technological and economic feasibility, but
which is not so extensive as to create a monopoly. 54
52This technical common law term arises in the U.S. diplomatic correspondence. See
letter from Peirce to Secretary of State Knox, July 30. 1909 and Diplomatic Protest of same
date from U.S. Legation to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Transaction #3746, 346 Numerical
File, Record Group 59, Department of State.53Note Verbale from Secretary of State to Norwegian Minister, Jan. 14, 1911, 2 Ameri-
can Legation in Christiana, Spitzbergen Correspondence, 1910, Record Group 84, Depart-
ment of State.54See, supra, footnote 27, authorities cited therein, and the accompanying text.
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F. Method of Claim
The procedure which the Arctic Coal Company followed in recording its
claims to the tracts of coalbearing lands in Spitzbergen with the Depart-
ment of State54a was not unique to this country's practice, but was followed
by all the states whose nationals claimed to exercise rights over mineral
tracts in the archipelago. This is testified to, for example, by the fact that
the Arctic Coal Company's title to its Advent Bay Tract ("Tract No. I")
stemmed from its purchase from Trondhjem- Spitzbergen Kulcompagnie, a
Norwegian enterprise.54 b
The title that company showed to the purchaser was the recordation of
its claim with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The sale was
also recorded with that Department. 54 c The British practice was reported
to be similar. Thus Shepstone tells us that:
The question of titles to land is most important. So far the practice has been
for a mining company, on taking land, to erect notices to that effect, and to
notify their own Foreign Office, where the claim is registered, if no previous
claim invalidates it. This notification constitutes the real title-deed, and the
British Foreign Office several years ago promised British mining companies
that their claims would be safeguarded. All land titles of the two British
companies named above are perfectly valid and beyond dispute. The same is
true of the Norwegian, Swedish, and Russian estates. But Spitzbergen has
already attracted adventurers, and complications are bound to ensue owing to
attempts to jump claims.54d
All the sources which have been studied, common law, civil law and
international law, indicate the acceptance of the traditional rule of qui prior
est tempore potior est jure (he who is first in time is first in right). They
also reflect the requirement of a public and recorded announcement or
declaration of the claim, as well as due dilligence in the working of its ore
body, and an equitable limitation as to the area to prevent monopoly.
In England, for example, the requirement of publicity was anciently
satisfied by recordation in the stannaries courts of Cornwall and Devon-
shire, and in the Great Court of Barmote of Derbyshire. In the American
West, and before the advent of state or federal legislation, a mining camp
54
"See, letter from N. Wilson to Secretary of State Bryan, March 10. 1914. and attach-
ments including descriptions of tracts possessed by the claimants [ 1906], Department of State.
Miscellaneous Letters. March 1906, Parts 11 & 111, Record Group 59, Department of State,
and letter of acknowledgement from Acting Secretary of State Bacon to Messrs Ayer and
Longyear c/o N. Wilson, March 14, 1906 recognizing the "possession and ownership" of the
coalbearing lands in them, 288 Domestic Letters 526 (Feb.-March, 1906), Record Group 59,
Department of State. See also, supra, notes 43.44 and 46, and accompanying textual matters.
54bSee letter from Messrs Ayer and Longyear to Secretary of State Root, March 1, 1906




54dShepstone, supra note 38, at 376.
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recorder, usually an official elected by the miners themselves, maintained
public records of the claims and of transactions affecting them. 54 e Sub-
sequent state and federal legislation continues the requirement of publicity
by providing registration procedures and requiring that claims should be
registered.
Be these statutory procedures as they may, clearly they reflect an an-
tecedent and underlying common law requirement which continues in
effect where the statutory facilities do not operate. It is therefore necessary
to devise a procedure which will adequately satisfy the duty to give due
and adequate notice of an enterprise's claim where the statutes of the
United States (and other countries) do not provide the appropriate proce-
dures for giving the necessary notoriety to the claim. Finally, the practice
of all interested countries with respect to their nationals' holdings in Spitz-
bergen prior to 1920, evidenced a practice pointing to similar principles in
international law.54f
For an American enterprise, the traditional common law prescription of
publicity could be more than adequately satisfied by the recording of a
Deed Poll containing the essential information and claims at an appropriate
county recording office. Copies of this recorded document could well be
served on both the Department of State and the Department of the Interi-
or. The deed should be accompanied by such necessary informational
documents as maps, affidavits as to working, surveys, fixes defining the
location of notices, buoys and mineral samples as would constitute a clear
definition of the tracts claimed.
The information and claims set out in the Deed Poll or annexed thereto,
should also be advertised in a summary manner in the legal columns of the
leading metropolitan newspapers of the United States and other countries,
with present or projected deep sea mining enterprises. These advertise-
ments should include a description of the mining area the subject of the
claim, an announcement of the enterprise's intention to work the area, and
notification of the fact of recordation, its date and location.
Publication in terms of this proposal would satisfy three fundamental
policy requirements of mining law: (i) establishment of priority in time and
therefore priority in right; (ii) protection of the equities of the claim owner
54eAMERICAN LAW OF MINING 23.
54For the method of proving these titles so that they became binding upon the Norwe-
gian Government after the entry into force of the Treaty of Paris of 1920, see Annex to the
Treaty. It should be noted that the tasks of "the Commissioner" appointed under the treaty,
and of the "Tribunal" which was to be brought into being in the event of disputed or rejected
titles, were not to clothe inchoate claims with legal validity, but to transform the former titles,
which had been valid in international law under the terra nullius r6gime of Spitzbergen, into
equally valid titles which became, by the disposition of the treaty, effective in the domestic
law of Norway, and binding upon that Kingdom as the new sovereign of the islands.
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against conflicting equities; and (iii) places any adverse claimant on notice
of the recording enterprise's right, and calls on him to take prompt legal
action to vindicate his adverse claim or to be held guilty of laches.
III. The Relevance of Custom
and "General Principles"
If some may doubt, despite the widespread acceptance throughout the
world of mining right concepts, not only in domestic law relations but
under such international r6gimes as that on Spitzbergen prior to the Treaty
of Paris in 1920, that the legal principles put forward in the preceding
section may not be immediately applicable to the seabed, at least they must
agree that there is, in general international law, the potentiality for such a
mining r6gime. Deriving from both the Spitzbergen precedent and the
general principles just outlined, that r6gime could emerge as a special
seabed custom with great rapidity. In addition to the observations already
made, the following considerations are relevant to the speedy emergence of
a customary seabed r6gime along the lines indicated in Section 11:
(1) In The Scotia5 4 9 the United States Supreme Court established that
length of time is not an element in the formulation of a rule of customary
international law, but that recent practice and the acceptance thereof as a
claim of right or duty (as the case may be), by the major interested states is
sufficient. 54 h
(2) The general world community interest calls for the mining of man-
ganese nodules, on the basis which precludes the possibility of similar
bitter feelings and controversies emerging, as those engendered by the
contemporary free-for-all in high seas fisheries. Hence, rather than promote
the anarchy which would follow the application of the traditional freedom
of the high seas, a special custom of deepsea mining should be discerned as
emerging whereby the right of capture is mitigated by the recognition that
rights can enure over the resource to be taken while that resource is still on
the sea floor.
This would not be a unique exception to the generally understood
principle of the right of capture, which requires that the person claiming
ownership must have reduced the object to his physical possession and
control. Such mitigations of the narrow right of capture familiarly under-
stood in the context of fisheries, were developed in the Greenland and
5481 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1871).54hThe acceptance of recent practice reflecting a claim of right as customary international
law, has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, [1969] ICJ 3, 24.
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Galapagos whale fisheries. 54 i These are, finally, supportive of both the
prevention of violence and the recognition of the equities of those who
have invested time, effort and capital in their searches and hunting, and
preparations for the final apprehension of the target resource.
(3) Article 38 paragraph L.c of its Statute calls on the International
Court of Justice to apply "the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations" as a source of international law. The system, com-
pendiously described as "mining rights," whether found on Spitzbergen
before 1920, or in California, Australia or South Africa, whereby a miner,
on discovering a mineral lode or deposit, has been shown, in the discussion
in the preceding sections to qualify, in terms of equity, acceptance, wide-
spread provenance and utility, as international law under this rubric.
VI. "Moratorium" and "Common Heritage"
A criticism of the arguments I have just outlined, based on any supposi-
tions of the legal impact of the Moratorium Resolution,54i must fail. The
former Legal Adviser of the State Department, Mr. John R. Stevenson,
during his term of office, said on a number of public occasions that the
Moratorium Resolution is not legally binding on the United States. Al-
though he did concede that it should be given "good faith consideration," '5 5
this must be seen as dependent also on the good faith of the states
promoting it, in accepting an international r6gime in a timely way. Two and
a half years have now elapsed and no treaty r6gime is in sight. This is a
541A Note on tne Law of Possession and the Right of Capture: Under the right of capture
it could be argued that an ocean miner can only claim to have legal possession and title to
nodules when he has reduced them to his exclusive physical custody and control, i.e., only
when he has caught them in his gathering equipment. This is an unnecessarily restrictive view.
Nor is it relevant to the exigencies of the mining of manganese nodules from the ocean floor
since its main ocean law provenance has been in terms of fin fisheries. This restrictive view
has not been applied in other fisheries in which the practicalities and the need for public order
have dictated a recognition of symbolic, without actual possession-for example the special
whale fishery customs of Greenland and Galapagos. (See HOLMES, supra note 7, at 212). In
the context of deep ocean mining, the taking of the first nodule from the claimed ore body in
an equitably acceptable and determinate area, should be deemed to establish possession over
all the nodules within that area. The taking of the first sample nodule should be viewed as a
symbolic taking of possession of all the nodules which it represents as a sample, since the
enterprise has, from that moment on, a clear intention of taking all the others in the claimed
area, plus the technological power to reduce them to its physical control by means of the
knowledge it gains from the sample, and the procedures of collection and processing which
that sample calls for.
5
'JG.A. Res. 2574 D. 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30 at I1. U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).55 Letter from John R. Stevenson, Chairman Interagency Law of the Sea Task Force, and
Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Senator Henry M. Jackson, May 19, 1972, Hearings
on S. 2801 ("Development of Hard Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed") Before the
Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. at 74-75 (1972).
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period which permits us all to question the good faith of the Moratorium
Resolution's promoters.
Second, the General Assembly's mandate to the Seabed Committee
included the injunction to promote the exploitation of the resources of the
seabed. The Moratorium Resolution, unless it is treated as a brief interim
measure, negates that mandate. In such a contradictory posture of the two
resolutions, the mandate should prevail, since it was the more widely
supported,56 was seen as a constitutive measure, and is in terms of the
enhancement of world welfare; while the Moratorium Resolution negates
that welfare in favor of a few states the prices of whose mineral production
it seeks to support artificially against competitive alternatives.
Third, one of that Resolution's promoters has recently conceded, in a
statement for which no ascription can be given, that the Moratorium
Resolution was intentionally and specifically directed against the private
enterprise interests of the United States and other private enterprises of
developed countries. It was framed to have a "chilling effect" on investors.
It is not in the interests of the United States to have the economic
efficiency of its investment market distorted by intervention from the
outside by political maneuvers of this kind. This may be underscored by
President Nixon's statement that:
I do not, however, believe that it is either necessary or desirable to try to halt
exploration and exploitation of the sea-beds beyond a depth of 200 metres
during the negotiating period.
Accordingly, I call on all other nations to join the United States in an
interim policy. ... The r6gime should accordingly include due protection for
the integrity of investments made in the interim period.
56 
n
For the three reasons just adumbrated, it would be counter-productive to
American interests to see this Resolution as available for the stultification
of either the development of customary norms in the area or the application
of the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
An oral criticism of both the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources
Act,57 and the position outlined in this paper, has been offered by a friend
of this writer who took up a devil's advocate role. He argued the character-
ization, in Article 1 of the United Nations 1970 Declaration of Principles
5 6(a) The vote on the Resolution establishing the seabed committee was: For, I11;
Against, 0; Abstaining, 7; Absent, 0. (b) The vote on the Moratorium Resolution was: For,
62; Against, 28; Abstaining, 28; Absent, 8. None of the major maritime states voted in favor
of the Moratorium Resolution. This voting pattern negates the possibility of any claim that a
consensus exists such as that called for by such writers as Falk, Higgins and Onuf. who seek
to find a law indicating force in some of the resolutions of the United Nations General
Assembly.
56aStatement by President Nixon on the Oceans Policy of the United States, 23 May
1970, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/22, 9INT'L LEG. MATERIALS 807, 808 (1970).57See, supra, note 3.
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Governing the Sea-Bed and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction,58 of the seabed and subsoil beyond national jurisdic-
tion and their resources, as "the common heritage of mankind" would give
a legal basis for a foreign country to deny titles to minerals won from the
seabed and to goods manufactured from seabed resources, coming into its
jurisdiction in the flow of international commerce.
He further suggested that the recent litigation in Paris regarding Chilean
copper,59 or the older case of The Rose Marie,60 was available as a telling
precedent. The government which viewed the winning of seabed minerals
independently of an international regime as a wrongful taking of property
constituting part of the common heritage, could seek a judgment in its own
courts declaring that the importer had no title and sequestrating the
goods. 61 Such a characterization of seabed resources reflects a misunder-
standing of a number of legal principles.
This position, in effect, equates the common-heritage-of-mankind clause
with the Moratorium Resolution-in that both are seen as providing the
premise of an argument precluding any seabed activity dehors an inter-
national regime. Thus it would appear to be contrary to the policy of the
United States which has already been indicated.6 2 Finally, had the inter-
pretation now proposed been given to the common heritage clause, the
voting support it enjoyed, along with the other clauses of the Declaration
of Principles would not have been forthcoming.
It would have succeeded only in gaining the same voting support as that
given to the Moratorium Resolution. 63 Hence there can be no question of
this interpretation creeping under the umbrella of the support given to the
Declaration and qualifying the policy of the Moratorium Resolution as
"instant international law." '64
The second main argument against treating the common-heritage clause
58G.A. Res, 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp.- at-, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970), 10
INT'L LEG. MATS 220 (1971).
59Tribunal Decision of Chilean Copper Corporation' Plea of Sovereign Immunity in
Third Party Attachment, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATS 182 (1973).
61[1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 246 (Aden Sup. Ct. 1953).61The discussion did not take up the further situation of whether any property within the
jurisdiction and belonging to an "offending" enterprise engaged in the winning of deepsea floor
resources, could be used as the target for such litigation. This would be a possibility, however,
provided that the mining activity itself could be validly held to be an unlawful taking of the
resources.62See, supra, footnotes 55 and 56a and accompanying textual material of both footnotes.63For a contrast of the voting support given to each of these two Resolutions see, supra,
note 56.
6
,Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolution on Outer Space: "'Instant" International Cus-
tomary Law? 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965). For the relevance of voting support for the
United Nations General Assembly resolutions to the formation of international law see
Goldie, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases--A Ray of Hope for the International Court?
16 N.Y.L. FORUM 325, 342-49 (1970), and the authors therein cited as participants in the
debate.
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as establishing enforceable prohibitions, begins by pointing out that to
equate it with a rule characterizing the mineral resources of the seabed as
an estate held in common by all humanity. It follows from such a charac-
terization of the seabed, according to the thesis which the devil's advocate
then posed, that no one country, nor enterprise, could help themselves to
any part of the deep seabed's hard mineral resources without the consent
of all peoples, or their duly appointed representatives-namely the autho-
rities or organs constituted under the treaty regime empowered to license
states and/or enterprises.
To assert this entitlement is to assume that the word "humanity" in the
clause indicates no more than the people now living. It also assumes that
"humanity" is to be viewed only as organized by states, so that only the
states of the world, acting in common, can create the regime which, as a
sort of delegate, authorizes the use of the seabed's resources. This argu-
ment thus transmutes the slogan "common heritage of mankind" into the
legal concept of "property in common of the states now existing" (or "the
property in common of the states existing at date of the treaty r6gime's
coming into force"-or ". . . date of signature"?) One caution lawyers,
diplomats and statesmen should observe is to avoid trying to treat "lay-
man's language" as if it were formulated in terms of technical legal con-
cepts-especially when that layman's language is a political slogan.
On the other hand, the phrase "common heritage of mankind"-a lay-
man's formula if ever there was one- should be given the greatest respect.
While it should not, indeed cannot, be viewed as a prescription, it can be
accepted as an important hortatory message, a kind of "policy direc-
tive"-to draw an analogy with the policy directives in the Irish and Indian
constitutions. Like those provisions, it expresses fundamental values, but
like them too, ir requires further implementation. It cannot be seriously
claimed that the "heritage-of-mankind" clause is a self-executing in-
strument creating, without further implementing agreements, titles, prohibi-
tions and rights.
Conceding, for the moment, the thesis that the phrase "common heritage
of mankind" prescribes the worldwide, or humanity-wide, common own-
ership of seabed mineral resources, it should be pointed out that the state
action against the United States enterprise which was hypothesized would
still not be justifiable under international law. For such action to be lawful
there would have to be a legal rule requiring that (assuming the words
"common heritage of mankind" have created a joint property in the seabed
minerals), without the prior agreement of all the joint owners, no individual
joint owner can exercise his individual rights to the property he jointly
owns with all the others.
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There is no such rule applicable in any situation remotely relevant to the
one under discussion. Certainly there is not one which would qualify as a
"general principle of law recognized by civilized nations" under Article
38.1.c of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The argument
based on the supposed existence of such a rule is simply not consistent
with the theories of concurrent interests in the jurisdictions of the common
law and the civil law. (True, there was a rule in old pre-classical Roman
Law which provided that one owner of a number-holding land in common,
could not build on the common property without the consent (or
non-prohibition) of all the others.)
The modern common law is well expressed as follows in American Law
of Property, an authoritative treatise (footnotes omitted):
There are many American cases that agree with the English cases in the view
that an individual co-tenant may develop and operate mines, quarries, and oil
wells without being liable for waste. It has also held that a co-tenant may cut
and sell timber, if such operations have the same relation to the reasonable
use and enjoyment of property as they would have in the case of a sole owner
in fee. 65
Where a co-tenant opens new mines or oil wells, or cuts new forests,
beyond his share, he should be "merely held to a duty to account for the
net profits received from such operations, less the expenses thereof."' 8
Roman Law may not have developed its concepts regarding interests in
common to the same level of sophistication as did the common law. On the
other hand, contemporary civil law jurisdictions are evolving similar results
as those long brought about in the Anglo-American system.
International law, too, has its concepts and precedents. It is not arguable
that the "common-heritage-of-mankind" clause creates an international law
condominium in the resources of the deepsea bed. This could only be done
by a dispositive treaty having a similar effect in international law to a deed
of conveyance in domestic law. It would require the formal signature of all
states to such an important quitclaim. But even if, granting the unlikely'
event, the clause were to have a dispositive effect, the devil's advocate
position that no state or enterprise could take seabed minerals beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction, because they belonged to all would still be
incorrect.
International law shows examples of joint use of territory in terms of: (1)
separate exercise of joint sovereignty; (2) joint exercise of separate sover-
eignty; (3) joint exercise of joint sovereignty. 67 But even this last, for
example the Anglo-French Condominium over the New Hebrides, left
62 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 64-65 (Casner ed. 1952).
661d., 65-66.
671 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 453-55 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955).
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each state with separate sovereignty over its own citizens. Examples of the
joint exercise of joint sovereignty do exist. Perhaps the best known was the
original four power control of Berlin. But this again, had to be specifically
provided for by treaty.
The frustrations which ensued led to a new r6gime by which three
parties individually contributed their shares of the joint powers to a new
(three-power) joint effort and the fourth, through its delegates in East
Germany, individually exercises its share of its joint authority in East
Berlin. The paralyzing effect of that particular effort to exercise joint
sovereignty jointly, is to be found in Peter Ustinov's wickedly humorous
play "The Love of Four Colonels."
The formula "common heritage of mankind" in paragraph 1 of the 1970
Declaration thus cannot justify the prevention of states from individually
exercising their common property rights. If a government did manage,
through action in its courts, to bring about the sequestration envisaged, its
conduct would be contrary to international law. It could, accordingly, be
held accountable to states which espoused the claims of their citizens
arising out of such proceedings on the ground that it had been, under the
pretence of enforcing international law, engaged in a sequestration of
property on the basis of a misrepresentation of what international law
permits.
This would be "a confiscation ... by an act of state in violation of the
principles of international law." 68 Hence the conduct envisaged as a repris-
al for an enterprises taking of seabed minerals could attract litigation
brought against the intervening government within the jurisdiction here in
the United States to the extent permitted by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, the "Hickenlooper (Sabbatino) Amendment" 6 9 and First Na-
tional City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba.70 Such a reaction might well
be copied in other consumer countries providing the major markets for
mineral raw materials around the world. Hence the step envisaged by the
devil's advocate could be turned against the intervening state and become a
nightmarish enactment of the Sorcerer's Apprentice" in political rather
than musical terms.
V. Domestic United States Enterprises
and Deepsea Mineral Exploitation
The discussion so far has been predicated on the international legal
6 8This phrase is taken from the "Sabbatino Amendment" (or "Hickenlooper Amend-
ment"), Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 §301(d)(2). 22 U.S.C.A.§2370(e)(2).
6922 U.S.C.A. §2370(e)(2). Supra, footnote 68.
70406 U.S. 759 (1972).
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relations of deepsea mineral exploitations by enterprises operating under
the laws of different states. It is also necessary to indicate briefly the
relations of two or more American enterprises. Should a United States
competitor seek to interpose a claim to work within an equitably deter-
mined seabed area, already being worked by an American enterprise which
first engaged in developmental or production activities under a valid claim
of right, then the entity first establishing its possession would be entitled to
have its rights vindicated under United States law, against the enterprise
which was second in possession and, hence, second in right. United States
law would govern the relations of both, despite the fact that location of
their dispute was beyond the territory of this country.
A. Values Involved
In the domestic legal order, as in the international, the basic values of
laws governing the winning resources are the protection of the environ-
ment, the maximization of the material goods to be gained from placing
resources in commerce, and assuring public order. These values neces-
sarily call for the encouragement of the discovery of new resources, and
the creation of incentives to work effectively to win those already dis-
covered. The traditional "miners' rights" custom, which has prevailed
wherever the common law has governed mining under lands unalienated as
to the surface, 7 1 and in the absence of a statute, provides that each miner is
entitled to the exclusive right to mine an area of such dimensions that he
has the capability of exploiting it over a period of time, and yet one which
does not unreasonably monopolize or engross the whole resource to the
exclusion of other participants.
B. Common Law Basis
Research and analysis of the legislative histories of federal and state
laws containing "grandfather clauses," protecting mining claims indicate
the recognition of rights which were created anterior to the statutes' enact-
ment and therefore under the common law.72 It is conceded that these
rights may not have found, in their inception, their creation in the decision-
al laws of federal and state courts so much as in the customs of the mining
communities. These customs did not spring, fully articulated and devel-
oped, out of the turbulent mining communities of California. They have a
long and unbroken history in English and Germanic mining customs, and in
7 1 For a discussion of the common law underpinnings of miner's right see §11B infra.72See, Field J., in Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457-61 (1878). See also Traynor J., in
Ames v. Empire Star Mines Co., 17 Cal. 2d 213, 110 P. 2d 13, 16, cert. den. 314 U.S. 651
(1941).
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 4
International Law for Seabed Rdgimes
the common law, which can be traced back to the medieval period, if not
earlier.
C. The Extra-Territorial Operation of
the Common Law
Insofar as it may be applicable, the common law governs United States
citizens and enterprises whenever they are beyond the jurisdiction of the
United States, especially when they are not subject to the jurisdiction of
any other country. When mining on the high seas, United States citizens
and enterprises are governed by the laws of the United States and by the
common law of their state of citizenship (or of the United States if such is
applicable) on three bases: (i) if the ships engaged in the mining enterprise
are American flag ships, then the laws of the United States govern by
virtue of the flag; (ii) when operating in an area not subject to the sover-
eignty of any state, the personal law of the individual governs his con-
duct-an illustration of this was provided by the operations of the Boston
mining corporation which won coal from Spitzbergen (at that time a mas-
terless territory) in the first decade of this century; 73 and (iii) wherever
people subject to the common law have worked together in an area not
governed by the law of any other state their relations have been governed
by the common law. A statement by Chief Justice Field on this point is
singularly apposite. He said:
[S]o when American citizens emigrate into territory which is unoccupied by
civilized man, and commence the formation of a new government, they are
equally considered as carrying with them so much of the same common law,
in its modified and improved condition under the influence of modern civ-
ilization and republican principles, as is suited to their new condition and
wants. 7
4
This paper has already demonstrated that the common law included and
established the principle of miner's rights wherever there is no statute
regulating this right. Should the mining activities of two American mining
enterprises confront one another on the seabed (an area having neither a
government nor a body of civil law), the common law including that of
miner's rights governs this confrontation over claims to resources to be
mined.
73See supra, § I IC.74Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 226 (1860). See also I BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND, Intro., §4, at 107 (T. Colley ed. 1871); Cooper v. Stuart, 14 App. Cas.
286 (1889); Delohery v. Permanent Trustee Co., 2 Commonwealth L. Rep. (Australia) 345
(1905); Mitchell v. Scales, 5 Commonwealth L. Rep. (Australia) 405 (1907); Blankard v.
Galdy, Salk. 411 (1672); Forbes v. Cochran, 2 B. & C. 488 (1824); Catterall v. Catterall, I
Rob. Ecc. 581 (1847); Kielly v. Carson, 4 Mores Privy Council 84 (1842). M. RADIN,
ANGLo-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 274 (1936). This proposition is standardly reflected in the
Reception Statutes of the several states, see e.g., N.Y. CoNsT.,Art. 1,§ 14 (McKinney 1970).
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Finally, it is commonly understood that international law is part of the
common law. 75 Hence the arguments set forth in that context in Sections 11
B-E above are, ceteris paribus, also applicable here.
VI. Conclusion
Independently of Congress's enactment of the Deep Seabed Hard Min-
erals Resources Act, enterprises may prove and develop mining tracts on
the deep seabed, of a reasonable size. Translating "reasonable" into factual
claims would depend on a number of criteria including the nature of the
resources to be won and their distribution, equitable considerations of
other claims to win the same resource, and what could be considered as
within the scope of a possessory intent and control on the part of the
enterprise. These rights are not subject to impairment through any dis-
paragements advanced under the United Nations Assembly's 1969 Mora-
torium Resolution or 1970 Declaration of Legal Principles.
Deep seabed mining claims should be recorded by filing with the Foreign
Office of a claimant's country of nationality, all documents necessary to
show title. These should include a Deed Poll announcing to the world the
recording enterprise's claim, a surveyor or navigator's description of the
tract in terms of fixes, bearings and distances, evidence of possession and
of continued active exploitation of the resource, an intent to assert ex-
clusive rights to exploit the mineral resources of the tract, and testimony
that the enterprise was "first in time."
These specific acts reflect the good faith intention of giving adequate
notice of the making of a claim, in the absence of relevant and applicable
statutes and treaties. The purpose is to give the most practical available
means of effectively publicizing an enterprise's claim, thereby putting all
interested parties on notice, either actual or constructive (i.e., the notice
was there and available to the world, had any adverse claimant but taken
reasonable steps to inform himself of the facts).
75Triquet and others v. Bath, 3 Burr. 1478 (1764); Barbuit's Case, Cas. t. Talb. 280
(1735); West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. v. The King [1905] 2 K.B. 391; Mortensen v.
Peters [1906] 8 Sess. Cas. (5th Ser.) 93; Paquette Habana 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Talbot v.
Janson, 3 Dall. 133 (1795); Ware v. Hylton, 3 Call. 199 (1795); The Rapid, 8 Cranch 155
(1818); Peters v. McKay, 195 Ore. 412, 238 P. 2d 225 (1952).
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